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A REAPPRAISAL OF THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM
In recent years an alarming gap has developed between employee
expectations and the actual performance of private pension plans."
Statistics indicate that although twenty-eight million workers2 are osten-
sibly covered by some form of private pension plan,3 few will ever
1 Although private pension plans vary greatly in detail, they fall into two general
categories. The first is the insured plan, in which an employer purchases a pension policy
from an insurance company. The insurer undertakes to provide the employees with an
annual income when they retire. The employer usually assumes no continuing obligation
to pay the premiums for the policy. In return the insurance company must pay benefits
only if the insurance contract is still in force at the time of a claim and only to employees
who meet the eligibility requirements of the policy. There are approximately 9 million
workers covered under insured private pension plans. BUREAU OF Tm CENSUS, U.S. DRP'T OF
CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRACr OF THE UNrrii STATES: 1971, at 285 (1971).
The second category of private pension plans is the noninsured plan, of which the
pension trust is most prevalent. Under this arrangement an employer pays contributions
into a trust fund. The fund is generally administered by either a corporate trustee, a board
of trustees appointed by the employer, or an employer and a union jointly. When an
employee retires, the trust fund will purchase an annuity for the employee or will pay
benefits directly from the fund. There are approximately 20.8 million employees under
noninsured private pension plans. Id. See M. BmuSTmN, THE FUTUa OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
16-18 (1964).
Approximately one-half of all private pension plans is collectively bargained. The
other half is the result of unilateral employer action. Id. at 19. Although employee
contributory plans originally predominated, pensions funded solely by employers constitute
the bulk of such plans today. D. McGILL, FUNDA MNTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 100 (2d ed.
1964).
2 The growth in both coverage and reserve assets of private pensions in the past 30
years has been phenomenal, and the rate of development is expected to proceed even
more rapidly in the future.
GROWTH OF PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL PENSION PLANS
1940 1950 1960 1965 1970 1980 (est.)
Covered Employees (millions) 4.1 9.8 21.2 25.4 28.2 42.0
Fund Assets (S billions) 2.4 12.0 52.0 85.4 125.1 214.0
D. HOLLAND, PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS: PROJEcrED GRowTH 2, 29, 67 (1966); BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, supra note 1; 1971 CONG. Q. REF. 975.
3 The lengthening of a worker's life span has been accompanied by a significant
decrease in the employment of the elderly. Only 4.3% of the population in 1910 was age
65 or over, but almost 10% fell within that category in 1970. Such persons, however,
comprised only 8.7% of the labor force. D. McGI.L, supra note 1, at 1; BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, supra note 1, at 23, 212. As a result, more retired workers are dependent upon old
age assistance for a longer period of time. Although Social Security payments have risen at
a rate of 5% over the last two years, the cost of living has increased at the even higher
rate of 6.5%. The minimum monthly Social Security benefits of $70.40 per worker or
$105.60 per couple thus are still inadequate to ensure a decent standard of living. See
Act of March 17, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-5, § 201(a); see also, CONF. Riw. No. 92-42, 92d Cong.,
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receive retirement benefits. Figures recently released by a Senate Labor
Subcommittee reveal that only between five percent and sixteen percent
of those covered by private pension plans have ever received benefits. 4
Such figures underscore the need to reexamine the purposes and opera-
tion of the private pension system.5
I
VESTING REQUIREMENTS
The primary reason why so few retired workers receive pension
benefits is that they fail to meet the vesting requirements of their
plans.6 Private pension plans usually specify conditions which an em-
ployee must satisfy before he can claim a pension as of right. Typical
1st Sess. (1971); MONTHLY LAB. REv., Aug. 1971, at 106. These figures emphasize the
importance of private pensions to the elderly.
4 The subcommittee surveyed a random cross-section of 1,500 private pension plans
representing diverse segments of the pension industry. To make the sample as homogenous
as possible only plans established prior to 1950 were analyzed. One group of plans in a
preliminary sample had either no vesting provisions or allowed vesting after 11 or more
years of service. The survey revealed that only 5% of the workers eventually received
pension payments under such plans. The second category of plans in this preliminary
sample demanded 10 or fewer years of service for pension rights to vest. The survey
showed that only 16% of employees covered under these plans subsequently became
entitled to pension benefits. The subcommittee surveyed 51 plans with total assets of
more than $10 billion in the first category, and 36 plans with over $6 billion in assets in
the second. 117 CONG. REc. S 4662-68 (daily ed. April 5, 1971).
In regard to the study findings, Senator Javits recently testified before the Senate
Labor Subcommittee:
While these results are "preliminary"--in the sense of not being statistically
all-encompassing-they are sufficiently sobering to alert all of us to the danger-
ously inequitable provisions in private pension plans and the hardship and
privation that has been worked on thousands upon thousands of employees.
Hearings on Examination of Private Welfare and Pension Plans Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1971).
5 See N.Y. Times, April 17, 1971, at 28, col. 1 (editorial); TIME, Aug. 23, 1971, at 48;
U.S. NEws & WOaLD REP., April 12, 1971, at 46.
6 Vesting is the attainment by a participant in a pension plan of a right to benefits
that is not contingent upon his continuing employment or fulfilling other conditions.
McGill, Language of Pensions, 10 TExraooK FOR WELFA E, PENSION TRUSTES AND ADmNIs-
TRAoaxs 147 (1968). There are three types of vesting requirements. "Deferred full vesting"
gives an eligible worker a right to all accrued benefits when he meets the requirements
specified in the plan. An example would be to allow an employee who has worked 25
years and until he was age 60 a full pension beginning at age 65. "Deferred graded
vesting" allows an employee to take a percentage of accrued benefits upon meeting
minimum requirements. This percentage increases as further requirements are met. See
notes 69-70 and accompanying text infra. The final type is "immediate full vesting" under
which benefits fully vest as they accrue. See Norman, Private Pensions: A Study of Vesting,
Funding, and Integration, 21 FrA. L. REv. 141, 151 (1968).
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vesting requirements of most plans include some combination of age
and continuous service. The overwhelming majority of workers is un-
able to satisfy these eligibility standards.
A. Voluntary Termination of Employment
The American labor force is characterized by a high degree of
mobility. Almost four million workers left their jobs in 1970. 7 A sub-
stantial number of all job changes results from employee choice rather
than involuntary separation." Employers purposely set age and service
requirements for vesting to take advantage of such job turnover prob-
abilities. Hence, workers who leave their jobs generally forfeit their
pension rights.9
B. Involuntary Termination
Often, through no fault of their own, employees lose their jobs.
Since few plans distinguish between voluntary and involuntary termina-
7 These figures are based upon a separation rate of 4.8% of the total 1970 civilian
labor force of over 82 million workers. This separation rate is slightly above the average
annual separation rate of 4.7% from 1968 through 1970. MONTHLY LAB. Rnv., Aug. 1971,
at 91 (Table 4), at 98 (Table 15).
8 The most recent Bureau of Labor Statistics survey on job mobility found the
following to be the main reasons for employees over age 25 leaving their jobs:
REASONS FOR LEAvING By Sax, 1961
Reasons for Leaving Men Women
Number (thousands) 5,783 2,335
Percent distribution 100.0% 100.0%
Improvement in status 35.2 31.2
Job loss 42.3 23.1
Termination of temporary job 8.6 15.6
Illness or disability 2.6 6.4
Household responsibilities .6 6.0
School responsibilities .7 .8
Other reasons 8.6 15.7
Not reported 1.5 1.1
Hearings on S. 3421, S. 1024, S. 1103, and S. 1255 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 253 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
9 Senator Javits summarized this problem as follows:
Contrary to the assumption on which most private pension plans are built,
in today's modern industrial society, labor mobility is the rule rather than the
exception. Very few employees work for one employer all their working lives.
In fact, very few work for one employer as long as 30 years or even 20 years.
Despite undeniable evidence of the enormous velocity in job changes among the
Nation's work force, private pension plans continue to be structured in a manner
which can only result in an abnormally high loss of pension benefits.
117 CONG. REc. S 8291 (daily ed. June 4, 1971) (emphasis in original).
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tion, the latter occurrence also results in loss of pension eligibility.10
Thus layoffs,'1 discharges (often without cause),12 business failures, 3
moves,14 and sales or mergers 5 can deprive an employee of his pension.
C. Death and Disability
Death prior to the vesting of benefits usually precludes a claim by
an employee's estate or his family to pension plan benefits.' 6 Unless the
plan includes a death benefit clause, the employer is also under no legal
obligation to pay benefits to the survivors of a vested participant.17
Likewise, an employee disability, even one which is job related, may
prevent an employee from meeting vesting requirements and disqualify
him from pension participation unless the plan provides otherwise.,
All of these occurrences may result in disqualification of employees
from pension benefits for failure to satisfy vesting requirements. Liber-
10 M. BE.RNsTmN, supra note 1, at 26.
11 Over 1.8 million workers were laid off in 1970. MoNTHI.Y LAB. REV., Aug. 1971, at
98 (Table 15). Such layoffs often break a continuous service record and disqualify
employees from pension benefits. See, e.g., Finnell v. Cramet, Inc., 289 F.2d 409 (6th Cir.
1961); Machinists Local 2040 v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884 (1959); Alexander Smith, Inc., 24 Lab. Arb. 165 (1955).
12 Unless the pension plan provides to the contrary, an employee who ceases work
for any reason is disqualified from pension eligibility. Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., 254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958); Bos v. United States Rubber Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d 565,
224 P.2d 386 (1950); Gitelson v. Du Pont, 17 N.Y.2d 46, 215 N.E.2d 386, 268 N.Y.S.2d 11
(1966); Stanley v. Caltex Petroleum Corp., 63 Misc. 2d 780, 313 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct.
1970).
18 Over 10,000 businesses failed in 1970. BuRaAu oF THE CENsus, supra note 1, at
475. As a result many employees whose pensions had already vested lost all pension
credits. Employees are also apt to lose benefits which have accrued under the plan of a
bankrupt employer. No priority is accorded to employee pension benefits or lost contribu-
tions in bankruptcy procedures. United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29
(1959); Los Angeles Hotel-Restaurant Employer-Union Welfare Fund v. Bowie, 283 F.2d
516 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 817 (1961).
14 See, e.g., Rankin v. Kellam, 388 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
15 There were over 2,300 mergers or sales of businesses in 1969. BuanAu oF THE
CENSUS, supra note 1, at 474. Such acquisitions often result in the termination of a
business entity; the assuming or new entity often has no duty to pensioned employees.
Even if the new entity assumes pension liabilities, it may institute mass layoffs of partici-
pants in such plans. Gorr v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 253 Minn. 375, 91 N.W.2d 772
(1958); Fernekes v. CMP Indus., Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 217, 195 N.E.2d 884, 246 N.Y.S.2d 201
(1963).
16 Frietzsche v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 705, 336 P.2d 589 (1959);
Grossman v. Precision Castings Co., 36 Misc. 2d 561, 233 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 19
App. Div. 2d 921, 245 N.Y.S.2d 329 (3d Dep't 1962).
17 Webb v. Warren Co., 113 Ga. App. 850, 149 S.E.2d 867 (1966).
18 Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'g 231 F.Supp. 980
(E.D. Tenn. 1964); Bogda v. Chevrolet-Bloomfield Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 8 N.J. Super.




alization of these stringent vesting conditions has been the principal
goal of pension reformers in both the judicial and legislative arenas.
II
TREATMENT OF PENSION PLANS IN THE COURTS
To a large extent, common law theories still control the judicial
attitude towards pension plans.'19 However, pension plans have not
received consistent treatment in the courts.
A. Pensions as Gratuities
Early judicial thinking viewed pension plans as mere gratuities.20
As gifts, pensions created no enforceable rights in the grantee-employee.
This theory corresponded to the terms of most early pension plans,
which included express provisions limiting the liability of the em-
ployer 2' and allowing for alteration or termination at the discretion of
management.22
1) Although there is a trend toward increased regulation of private plans by state
and federal legislation, the large body of common law, developed and expounded
in countless judicial decisions, still exercises a profound influence over the
establishment and administration of many pension plans, and determines the
rights of covered employees under those arrangements.
B. AARON, LEGAL STATUS OF EmPLOYEE BENE RIGHTS UNDER PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 5
(1961).
20 Industrial pensions appeared on the American scene during the last quarter
of the nineteenth century, but only within the last twenty-five years have they
assumed any significance in the old-age financial picture. In the beginning,
private pension benefits were universally regarded as gratuities from a grateful
employer in recognition of long and faithful service.
D. McGILr, supra note 1, at 16. See Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944);
Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 193 F. Supp. 699 (D.D.C. 1961), aff'd,
307 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Fickling v. Pollard, 51 Ga. App. 54, 179 S.E. 582 (1935);
Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1 II. App. 2d 514, 117 N.E.2d 880 (1954);
Umshler v. Umshler, 332 Ill. App. 494, 76 N.E.2d 231 (1947); Dolan v. Heller Bros. Co.,
30 NJ. Super. 440, 104 A.2d 860 (1954); McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 App. Div. 610,
53 N.Y.S. 98 (4th Dep't 1898), aff'd, 167 N.Y. 530, 60 N.E. 1115 (1901); Kravitz v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 5 Misc. 2d 368, 160 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Butler, 86 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
21 See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944).
22 Under the gratuity theory employers could reduce or terminate benefits even
after a person had retired. In re Missouri P.R.R., 49 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Mo. 1943); Fickling
v. Pollard, 51 Ga. App. 54, 179 S.E. 582 (1935); Umshler v. Umshler, 332 III. App. 494,
76 NX.E2d 231 (1947); cf., Gott v. Prudential Ins. Co., 212 N.C. 830, 192 S.E. 905 (1987).
Despite its often harsh results, the gratuity theory has proved a durable concept,
especially in New York. See Fernekes v. CMP Indus., Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 217, 195 N.E.2d
884, 246 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1963); Silfen v. United Whelan Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 523, 290
N.Y.S.2d 417 (Ist Dep't 1968), aff'd per curiam, 26 N.Y.2d 712, 257 N.E. 2d 53, 308
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1970); Barca v. Stein, 44 Misc. 2d 68, 252 N.YS.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1964),
aff'd per curiam, 265 N.Y.S2d 606 (Ist Dep't 1965).
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B. Pensions as Unilateral Contracts
A majority of courts has turned away from the gratuity theory and
has held that pension plans give rise to contractual liabilities on the
part of the employer.23 Under the unilateral contract theory, an em-
ployer offers a pension to an employee who signifies his acceptance by
remaining at his job for the requisite period of time.24
Under the contractual theory, the employee must not only meet
all of the conditions prescribed by his employer before benefits vest,25
but he may also be forced to satisfy the eligibility requirements con-
tained in the insurance or trust agreement which covers the pension
plan, even though he is not a party to the agreement.2 6 In addition, the
employee may also be bound by conditions in his collective bargaining
agreement.2 7 Such labor contracts, which most employees think liber-
alize eligibility requirements, often incorporate stringent vesting stan-
dards.28
Should an employee survive the hazards of job changes, layoffs,
mergers, or business failures, and in addition should he meet all of the
conditions of the employer's pension plan, the insurance contract or
trust indenture, or the collective bargaining agreement, he may still be
denied his pension. Private pension plans commonly contain provisions
23 B. AARON, supra note 19, at 9. See Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 144 Conn. 456,
133 A.2d 894 (1957); Stopford v. Boonton Molding Co., 56 N.J. 169, 265 A.2d 657 (1970);
Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St. 2d 242, 227 N.E.2d 229 (1967); Dailey v. Seattle, 54
Wash. 2d 733, 344 P.2d 718 (1959); Thornbery v. MGS Co., 46 Wis. 2d 592, 176 N.W.2d
355 (1970).
24 Comment, Consideration for the Employer's Promise of a Voluntary Pension Plan,
23 U. Cm. L. REv. 96, 99-100 (1955). Some courts also require knowledge of the pension
plan on the part of the employee before a unilateral contract can come into existence.
West v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 2d 597, 225 P.2d 978 (1951); Hindle v. Morrison
Steel Co., 92 N.J. Super. 75, 223 A.2d 193 (1966); Parsley v. Wyoming Automotive Co.,
395 P.2d 291 (Wyo. 1964).
25 See, e.g., Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958) (em-
ployees have no interest in pension fund until all vesting conditions are satisfied).
26 In Gallo v. Howard Stores Corp., 145 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd per curiam,
250 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1957), an employee was denied all pension benefits for failing to
seek his employer's approval of an early retirement as required by the underlying insur-
ance contract. This denial was upheld despite the absence in the employer's plan (as
embodied in a pamphlet sent by the employer to his employees) of such a requirement
(id. at 911), and despite a jury finding that the employee was justified in regarding the
pamphlet as the embodiment of the pension plan (id. at 912). The employee was never
given an opportunity to read the underlying contract. Id. at 911.
27 Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'g, 231 F. Supp.
980 (E.D. Tenn. 1964); Beaty v. Maritime Ass'ns-I.L.A. Pension, Welfare & Vacation Funds,
442 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (application for writ of error refused).
28 See, eg., 442 S.W.2d at 824 (25 years continuous service in the industry a pre-
requisite for receiving benefits).
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whereby boards are set up to administer the funds.29 These boards are
usually made up of company and union officials. They can determine
in their discretion whether a retiring employee has fully complied with
the eligibility requirements of the plan. As long as board decisions are
not arbitrary or motivated by fraud or bad faith, they are not review-
able by the courts. For example, boards have been allowed to disqualify
employees whom they concluded did not meet physical disability re-
quirements in a pension plan, despite medical evidence to the con-
trary. 0 The burden is on the employee to establish that such decisions
are arbitrary, based on fraud, or made in bad faith.3 1
In light of the stringent effect which courts give to vesting require-
ments in private pension plans under the unilateral contract theory,
employees fair no better under this theory than they did under the
gratuity theory.
8 2
C. Pensions as Deferred Wages
It has been established that pensions are part of wages for collective
bargaining purposes.m This doctrine was first enunciated in Inland
Steel Co. v. NLRBS4 and has been uniformly followed and expanded
in subsequent cases.3 5
Classifying pensions as wages corresponds to the way employers and
unions act regarding pensions. Unions often bargain for increased pen-
sions in lieu of wage raises,36 and deadlocks over pensions have led to
long and bitter strikes.37 As a result, unions justifiably argue that pen-
29 See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944).
30 Smith v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 109 N.H. 172, 246 A.2d 697 (1968). See
Lano v. Rochester Germicide Co., 261 Minn. 556, 113 N.W.2d 460 (1962); Gitelson v. Du
Pont, 17 N.Y.2d 46, 215 N.E.2d 336, 268 N.Y..2d 11 (1966); Weber v. Bell Tel. Co., 415
Pa. 292, 203 A.2d 554 (1964).
31 Gitelson v. Du Pont, 17 N.Y.2d 46, 215 N.E.2d 336, 268 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1966).
32 See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra; see also 117 CONG. REc. S 8293-96
(daily ed. June 4, 1971).
33 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1964).
34 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960, aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1949). Although the Su-
preme Court has never ruled directly on the duty to bargain over pensions as wages, it
has cited Inland Steel with approval. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203, 222 n.10 (1964); United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 33, 38 (1959);
cf. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 286-87 (1947).
85 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 40 U.S.L.W.
4043 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1971); Sylvania Elec. Prods. Inc. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 128 (Ist Cir.
1961); General Elec. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 510 (1948).
36 R. SHOEMAKER, PNSION PLANS UNDER COUX.rVF BARGAINING 1 (AFL-CIO 1954).
37 In 1950 the United Auto Workers struck Chrysler for 99 days over the issue of pen-
sions. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1950, at 1, col. 2. Undoubtedly, these Chrysler employees had
no idea that, despite winning the issue of the establishment of a pension fund, only a
small minority would ever receive the pension benefits. Note 4 supra.
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sion funds are made up of employees' wages and not of gratuitous or
contingent employer contributions. 8 Employers also consider pension
benefits as part of their overall wage costs. They respond to union de-
mands for increased pension contributions in terms of package wage
costs and require unions to forego immediate wage increases in return
for increased pension payments.3 9
III
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE: QUANTUM MERUIT
It should not be the role of the law to frustrate the expectations of
employees by sanctioning pension plan restrictions which disqualify the
majority of retired workers from the receipt of pension benefits. Despite
the logic and reality4° of the deferred wage theory, most courts still
literally apply narrow, contractual vesting conditions to deny pension
income benefits. This is true even though the law generally rejects con-
tractual conditions which result in forfeiture of an employee's money
wages. 41 Even if courts consider such contractual conditions in pension
plans to be valid, however, this should not rule out the possibility of a
recovery on the theory of quantum meruit.
A. Recovery When Employment Is Involuntarily Terminated
A quantum meruit basis for allowing employees to recover pension
benefits is strongest and has most support when employees are forced to
38 D. ALLEN, FRINGE BENEFITS: WAGES OR SOCIAL OBLIGATION? 255-56 (1964). The notion
that pension benefits are wages applies equally to nonbargained plans. The Senate Sub-
committee on Welfare and Pension Funds found this to be true:
These employer-employee plans, whether or not collectively bargained, or
whether contributed solely by management, or on a joint management-employee
basis, actually, and under existing law, proceed on the basis that the contribu-
tions to them by management are in the nature of employees' compensation for
employment or, stated in another way ... that the cost of an employee's service
is greater than the amount currently paid him as wages.
S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1956). See also Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F.
Supp. 338, 344 (D. Minn. 1967).
39 Somers & Schwartz, Pension and Welfare Plans: Gratuities or Compensation?, 4
IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 77, 82 (1950). This fact was also recognized by the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare which stated: "Regardless of the form they take, the em-
ployer's share of the cost of these plans or the benefits the employers provide are a form
of compensation." S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
40 The fact is that employers and unions, in increasing numbers, are negotiating
pension plans as if they represented wages deferred. The growth of this practice,
rather than its inherent logic or lack of it, is what may be counted upon to win
additional judicial acceptance of the theory.
B. AARON, supra note 27, at 13 (emphasis in original).
41 Seidenberg v. Duboff & Davies, Inc., 143 Misc. 167,*256 N.Y.S. 17 (New York City
Ct. 1932); Cato v. Grendel Cotton Mills, 132 S.C. 454, 129 S.E. 203 (1925); Burdette v.
Broadview Dairy Co., 123 Wash. 158, 212 P. 181 (1923).
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give up their jobs for reasons beyond their control.42 Section 357 of the
Restatement of Contracts sustains a recovery on a quantum meruit
theory:
(1) Where the defendant fails or refuses to perform his contract and
is justified therein by the plaintiff's own breach of duty or non-
performance of a condition, but the plaintiff has rendered a part
performance under the contract that is a net benefit to the de-
fendant, the plaintiff can get judgment... for the amount of such
benefit in excess of the harm that he has caused to the defendant
by his own breach, in no case exceeding a ratable proportion of the
agreed compensation, if
(a) the plaintiff's breach or non-performance is not wilful and
deliberate .... 4
An employee who is unable to meet pension requirements owing
to the actions of his employer has a strong case under section 357 since
the employer's failure to pay his pension is not "justified . . . by the
plaintiff's own breach of duty or non-performance of a condition." Such
an employee is willing and able to perform his end of the agreement. It
is the employer who has deprived him of an opportunity to satisfy the
conditions of pension plan benefits.
An employer presently receives substantial benefits when he ter-
minates a worker's employment without paying retirement benefits.
Contributions he makes to employee pension funds are tax deductible.
44
42 Ball v. Victor Adding Mach., 286 F2d 170 (5th Cir. 1956); Lucas v. Seagrave Corp.,
277 F. Supp. 38 (1. Minn. 1967). See also Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When
Plants Shut Down: Problems and Some Proposals, 76 HAIv. L. Ray. 952 (1968).
43 RnsrATEmNT oF CoNTcrs § 857 (1932). Comment c to section 857 points out that
this rule applies equally to conditions in unilateral contracts.
44 At the present time a pension plan must meet the requirements of section 401(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1970)), as implemented by TREAs. REG.
§ 1A01 (1956), for an employer to be able to deduct his payments into a pension fund. In
general these requirements are as follows:
1. There must be a trust, contract, or other legally binding arrangement.
The plan must be in writing and communicated to the employees.
2. The plan must be for the exclusive benefit of the employees or their
beneficiaries. Neither the corpus nor income of the plan can be used for any
other purpose than the payment of such benefits prior to the satisfaction of all
liabilities.
3. The benefits of the plan cannot discriminate in favor of officers, share-
holders, supervisors, or highly compensated employees.
4. The plan must cover a certain percentage of all employees, again so as
not to discriminate.
5. If the plan terminates or is discontinued, the benefits which have accrued
to employees up to that date must be credited to such employees.
The principal tax advantages which arise from qualification under section 401(a) are (1)
that employer contributions are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses
(INT. REv. CoDa oF 1954 §§ 162, 404); (2) that contributions are not taxed to the individual
employee until he receives the income (id. §§ 37(c), 402); and (3) that the investment earn-
ings of the plan are not taxed until the benefits are distributed (id. § 501).
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The employer also profits from the services the employee has rendered,
partially in hopes of pension benefits, without paying additional com-
pensation. Moreover, the employer can apply the forfeited credits of the
discharged employee to his pension liability to other employees. 45 To
allow these advantages to the employer, while depriving a worker of a
means of support in his retired years, is patently unjust.
Such inequity was recognized by a Minnesota federal district court
in Lucas v. Seagrave Corp.4 6 In Lucas, the employees brought an action
against Seagrave for earned pension benefits. Seagrave claimed that the
employees had no right to such benefits since they did not fully meet
the vesting requirements of the plan. In denying Seagrave's contention,
the district court recognized the compensatory nature of pension plans
and adopted a quantum meruit approach. The court held that since all
of the elements of unjust enrichment were present in this case,
[t]he employer must... return benefits conferred by the employee
as a result of his service....
[I]t does not seem just or logical to say that employees' involuntary
failure to perform the conditions for pension eligibility should
erase all credits accrued under a plan when the performance is un-
wanted and, indeed, prevented by the employer.47
The court in Lucas adopted the compensatory theory that pension bene-
fits represent deferred wages. On this ground the court was able to look
beyond the four corners of the pension plan and to take into account
the expectations of the parties and the realities of the situation.
B. Recovery When Employment Is Voluntarily Terminated
There is support for the view that employees who voluntarily leave
their jobs cannot recover pension benefits under the quantum meruit
theory.48 The rationale for the forfeiture is that employees assume the
risk of their own voluntary terminations, and employers depend on such
terminations in figuring the costs of their plans. 49 Support for this view
also stems from section 357 of the Restatement of Contracts, which dis-
45 The amounts involved in such forfeitures are usually considerable: Gorr v. Con-
solidated Foods Corp., 253 Minn. 375, 91 N.W.2d 772 (1958) ($170,000); Lucas v. Seagrave
Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338, 346 n.10 (D. Minn. 1967) ($50,000). See Bailey v. Rockwell Spring
& Axle Co., 13 Misc. 2d 29, 175 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1958), where the employer realized
almost $256,000 in pension forfeitures when he closed down one of his plants. M. Bans-
srmN, supra note 1, at 342 n.11.
46 277 F. Supp. 38 (D. Minn. 1967).
47 Id. at 345.
48 Id. at 346; Bernstein, supra note 42, at 963.
49 277 F. Supp. at 346; Bernstein, supra note 42, at 972.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
allows a restitutionary recovery to plaintiffs who are guilty of willful
breaches of contractual conditions.50
Such a view, however, is inconsistent with the theory that pensions
are compensatory in nature. There is no doubt that even if an employee
intentionally breaches his employment contract, the employer must pay
net wages due him less any harm caused the employer by the breach.
This doctrine was recognized in Britton v. Turner51 in 1834 and has
become the accepted and settled law in an overwhelming number of
jurisdictions. 52 There is no reason to treat pension contracts differently
from other forms of wages. To hold otherwise imposes a penalty on
workers to the extent that their forfeited benefits exceed the harm
caused the employer by their voluntary termination of the employment
relationship.
Unlike the employee who is forced to give up his job, the worker
who voluntarily leaves his employment should have his benefits reduced
in proportion to the harm resulting to his employer.
53 Undoubtedly, the
value of the harm in voluntary terminations would be difficult to deter-
mine. However, the additional costs of the administration of a propor-
tionate pension to the separated employee should be included.
54 That
amount of the employer's contribution which is attributable to the
longevity of the worker should also be deductible. One possible method
of determining the value of the loss to the employer could be through a
liquidated damages provision in the pension plan.5
5 In this way the
50 Note 43 supra.
51 6 N.H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713 (1834).
52 Humphrey v. Johnson, 73 Ind. App. 551, 127 N.E. 819 (1920); Porter v. Whitlock,
142 Iowa 66, 120 N.W. 649 (1909); Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. 84 (1878); Williams v. Crane,
153 Mich. 89, 116 N.W. 554 (1908); Peters v. Halligan, 182 Neb. 51, 152 N.W.2d 103 (1967);
Lynn v. Seby, 29 N.D. 420, 151 N.W. 31 (1915); Kirkland v. Archibold, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 481,
113 N.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1953); Burke v. McKee, 304 P.2d 306 (Okla. 1956); San Augustine
Indep. School Dist. v. Freelove, 195 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1946). Cf. Fritts v. Quinton, 118
Kan. 111, 233 P. 1036 (1925). See also 5A A. CORBIN, CONa.Acrs § 1127 (1963); 12 S. WnLiS-
TON, CONTRAcrs § 1477 (3d ed. 1957). Professor Corbin comments upon these cases as fol-
lows:
It is believed that modern labor legislation and the attitude displayed by the
courts . . . are now strongly in support of allowing recovery [by a defaulting
employee] as was done more than a century ago in Britton v. Turner. The dearth
of modern cases on either side is eloquent evidence that the mores of today would
not countenance decisions denying a restitutionary remedy.
A. CORBIN, supra § 1127, at 31-32.
53 This arrangement would still be consistent with a quantum meruit measure of
recovery which is the-net benefit unjustly retained. REsrATEMENr or CoTruAcrs §§ 357(1),
(3) (1932).
54 Since administrative costs may be greater than the pension benefits owed, the very
short term employee could likely claim no benefits.
55 A liquidated damages provision would be especially appropriate in this situation
since the harm caused by the-breach is uncertain and difficult to estimate in monetary
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parties to the plan could determine an average amount of harm and
deduct such an amount in individual circumstances.
56
The requirement of section 357 of the Restatement of Contracts that
plaintiff's breach be not "wilful or deliberate 57 would not necessarily
bar pension recovery by an employee who voluntarily left his job. Com-
ment f to section 357 states that, despite a willful breach by a plaintiff,
the defendant must return to him the excess of benefit over harm "if,
with knowledge that the breach has occurred or is impending, he [de-
fendant] assents to the part performance, or retains it or accepts the
benefit of it unreasonably."58 Although an employer usually would
have no actual notice of an impending breach in individual cases, he
could not deny knowledge that a certain number of employees might
terminate their employment within a given time period. Employers
rely on such turnover estimates in order to calculate their pension con-
tributions and future liabilities.
As the Restatement itself concludes: "Doubts in cases of this kind
are resolved in favor of the plaintiff, in order to avoid a forfeiture in
excess of harm suffered." 59 Employers should therefore be liable to
voluntarily separated employees for excess pension benefits under the
Restatement.
The quantum meruit theory would be a logical and realistic ap-
proach to curing many of the ills in the private pension system. Pension
plans could retain their individuality and flexibility without widespread
federal regulation. Besides making pensions fully vesting, the quantum
meruit theory might also have the effect of making them fully transfer-
able.60 In addition, quantum meruit would protect the legitimate in-
terests of the employer in cases where his workers voluntarily terminate
their employment. Most importantly, this theory would allow the re-
tired worker to receive the benefits which he has earned.
terms. RESTATEmEN OF CoNTmRAmS § 839(1) (1932). One method of setting up such a
provision could be through an accelerated vesting standard. See notes 69-70 and accom-
panying text infra.
56 The parties would be in a better position to determine the loss in such circum-
stances than a judge or a jury. RESrATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 339, comment c (1932). The
employer and the union could thus set the limits on benefits payable to employees who
quit their jobs or the employer could do this himself in nonbargained plans. If the
employer sets the value of the harm caused by the employee's breach too high, the
clause will not be a reasonable estimate of the damages and will be void as a penalty.
57 See Laube, The Defaulting Employee-No Retraction, 84 U. PA. L. Rzv. 69 (1936);
Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Re.Viewed, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 825
(1935); Williston, The Defaulting Employee-A Correction, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 68 (1986).
58 RESTATEMENT OF CONMACTS § 357, comment f at 626 (1932).
59 Id. at 627.
60 See notes 71-72 and accompanying text infra.
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Disappointingly few courts have granted a quantum meruit re-
covery of pension benefits to employees. 61 This fact underscores the dif-
ficulty of achieving any uniform solution to the private pension prob-
lem through the courts. Even if the quantum meruit theory were widely
adopted, it is doubtful whether many retired employees could afford
the expense of litigation to enforce their rights.
IV
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Many reformers have turned to Congress in hopes of attaining some
measure of pension reform.62 In response to these demands, a number
of legislative solutions have been proposed in the past few years to
remedy the evils in today's system.
63
The principal aim of these bills has been to liberalize vesting re-
quirements. Two basic methods are represented by bills introduced by
former Senator Ralph Yarborough64 and by Senator Jacob Javits.65 The
Yarborough proposal would reduce age and service requirements by
making pension benefits nonforfeitable after ten consecutive years of
service.66 His bill would thus create a compulsory minimum vesting
standard. On the other hand, Senator Javits has proposed a deferred
graded vesting standard. Under this approach an employee would have
a nonforfeitable right to at least ten percent of any pension benefits
earned after six years of employment. Each year thereafter an additional
ten percent would vest so that after fifteen years all benefits would be
fully vested.
67
61 To date, Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 838 (D. Minn. 1967) is the only
case in which such recovery has been allowed. See notes 46-47 and accompanying text
supra. The quantum meruit theory appears not to have been widely argued by counsel.
277 F. Supp. at 343.
62 The only substantial regulation of private pension plans, besides that found in
the Internal Revenue Code (note 30 supra), is the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure
Act- of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1970). This statute applies only to collectively
bargained pension plans. Its main thrust, similar to that of the federal securities laws,
is to require disclosures and filings of pension fund agreements. Since there is nothing
illegal or unusual about restrictive vesting requirements, employers and employer
organizations have no hesitation in publishing such provisions. This law therefore
involves n6 real, substantive regulation of the vesting problem.
63 See, e.g., S. 2, S. 1993, H.R. 9311, H.R. 2150, H.R. 7925, H.R. 10,050, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); S. 2348, S. 4326, S. 4327, H.R. 16,462, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. 2167,
S. 2736, H.R. 2080, H.R. 10,978, H.R. 11,884, H.R. 13,536, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969);
S. 3421, H.R. 14,851, H.R. 15,244, H.R. 17,046, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. 1024,
S. 1103, S. 1255, S. 1635, H.R. 686, H.R. 6697, H.R. 9304, H.R. 13,544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
64 S. 3421, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
65 S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
66 S. 3421, 90th Cong., 2d Ses. § 102 (1968).
67 S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 107(a)(1) (1971).
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One problem with either the ten-year minimum compulsory vest-
ing standard or the deferred graded vesting standard is that they fail to
distinguish between employer initiated terminations and voluntary
terminations. It is inequitable to deny employees who have been forced
to leave their jobs prior to ten years of service all pension benefits or to
compel them to accept reduced benefits if they are forced to leave prior
to fifteen years of service. However, the Javits recommendation of a
percentage receipt of pension benefits, if only applied to employees who
voluntarily terminated their employment, would be a better method
than the Yarborough proposal to take into account both the employer's
and the employee's interests.
A more serious difficulty with both the Yarborough and the Javits
proposals is that neither would protect workers who change jobs in the
early years of employment. Since turnovers are highest in this category
of employees, the preclusion of these workers from legislative protec-
tion would continue to disqualify a great number of employees from
any pension benefits.
68
One possible way to remedy this deficiency would be to grant em-
ployees who voluntarily leave their jobs pension benefits on an ac-
celerated percentage basis from the outset of their employment.69 In
68 M. BERNSrEiN, supra note 1, at 57-58 (table III).
69 Under this form of vesting a worker would start with a low level of benefits which
would increase at an accelerating rate the longer he stayed with his employer. A schedule
of benefits could be worked out by the parties through collective bargaining or by the
employer himself. To ensure fairness, approval by a government regulatory agency, such
as the proposed Pension and Employee Benefit Plan Commission could be required. Note
75 infra.
An example of an accelerated vesting schedule would be as follows:
SUGGESTED EMPLOYEE ScHEuLE Oro
PENsION BENE.nS UNDER A
TWENTY-YEAR PENSION PLAN
Number of Percent of












It should be kept in mind that the accelerated vesting standard would apply- only to
employees who quit their jobs. Employees who leave as a result of involuntary termina-
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this way an employee's pension would vest in proportion to the work he
performs. This accelerated vesting would-also take into account an em-
ployer's legitimate interest in promoting longevity.70 Such a method
of vesting would not only protect the employer's interest in retaining
experienced employees, but it would also avoid an all or nothing ap-
proach to pensions in a worker's early years of employment.
Another provision in many reform proposals provides for free
transferability of pension benefits.71 This would enable employees to
transfer pension credits from one employer to another without a loss of
vested interest. Perhaps the best method would be through a federally-
funded clearing house.72 Such an agency could keep records on em-
ployees who change jobs, could transfer vested pension benefits, and
could administer the payment of benefits when they came due.
However, one problem with some of the bills proposing such an
agency is that they unfairly place the onus of joining such a plan on the
employee.75 This device would in all probability be little used by em-
ployees, who are often not even given an opportunity to read their pen-
sion plan contracts.7 4 Rather the burden should be placed on the em-
ployer. Since a federally-funded clearing house could transfer pension
credits more efficiently and economically than could individual em-
ployers, the employers would have an incentive to take advantage of
such an agency. In this way employees' pensions would be fully port-
able.
Also meriting serious consideration is the proposal to establish a
Pension and Employee Benefit Plan Commission. 5 Such a regulatory
agency could enforce the substantive regulations of any new pension
tions should be given the full proportionate percentage of the pension they earn (e.g., a
worker who is permanently laid off after 10 years would be eligible for half of his pension
benefits under a 20-year plan).
70 See notes 79-83 and accompanying text infra.
71 See, e.g., S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301-07 (1971). See Levin, Proposals to Eliminate
Inequitable Loss bf Pension Benefits, 15 VILL. L. Rxv. 527, 533 nA0 (1970).
72 For a detailed analysis of the proposed clearing house arrangement, see Bernstein,
Transferable Credits and Clearing House Devices, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 765.
73 S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1971).
74 Although the Internal Revenue Service requires that employers communicate
their plan to employees in order for their pension contributions to be tax deductible
(note 44 supra), this does not mean that the plans will be fully and properly communi-
cated (see, e.g., note 26 supra). Moreover, failure by an employer to comply with these
Internal Revenue Service requirements cannot be used by an employee as a basis for
recovery. See Hudson v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 16, 21 (8th Cir. 1963);
Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338, 341-42 (D. Minn. 1967).
75 See, e.g., S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1971); H.R. 11,884, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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measure. It could also consolidate and efficiently enforce existing-federal
rules and regulations concerning private pensions.76
V
OBJECMONS TO REFORM
Despite widespread support for pension reform, powerful em-
ployer and insurance lobbies have strongly opposed federal regulation
of private pension plans.77 The two major objections to a pension sys-
tem requiring full or graded vesting standards and portable benefits are
that the basic pension plan policy to promote long service from faithful
employees would be undermined, and that the costs involved would
be too great for the average private employer to bear.
78
A. Longevity
One of the employers' most persistent claims is that pensions are a
means to retain more experienced and hence more valuable em-
ployees. 79 Despite this contention, pension plans in actual practice often
produce quite a different result. Employees who have worked many
years for one employer will have sizable credits in their pension ac-
counts. When business prospects are dim, to the extent an employer
can lay off these older employees he can realize great savings on forfeited
pension credits. An employer thus gains a double benefit: he may avoid
the payment of a pension to a worker who is near retirement and may
apply the forfeited pension benefits to future pension liabilities.80
To the extent that employers can use pensions to deter employees
from changing jobs, such plans lessen overall labor mobility. In an
78 For example, the Commission could pass on the eligibility of pension plans for
income tax deductions. Note 44 supra.
77 Hearings 289, 301, 307; 1970 CONG. Q. ALmANAc 770-72.
78 M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 244.
79 By cutting down on job changes, an employer can also reduce expensive turnover
costs. It is estimated that turnover costs average $500 for one employee. For some clerical,
machine production, and maintenance workers the costs can run as high as $6,000 per
worker. F. GAUaET, LABOR TURNOVER: CALCULATION AND CosT 37, 60 (1960).
80 By the same token, pension benefits often tend to discourage employers from hiring
older workers. Since such employees have a tendency to remain at a job for a longer period
than younger workers (note 68 supra), they are more likely to qualify for pension benefits.
As a result employers must contribute a larger amount to the accounts of these older
workers to maintain a given level of benefits. The reason for this is that the period of
contributions and the level of investment earnings for older employees is appreciably less
than for younger workers. However, under a full vesting transferable pension system
these deterrents would be eliminated. Since an older employee would arrive at his new
job with pension credits, his employer would not have to contribute additional funds in
order to maintain a given level of pension benefits.
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economy where rapid changes in technology and consumer demand for
goods and services create a changing demand for labor, a substantial
degree of job mobility is needed to achieve full utilization of the labor
force and to enable the economy to operate at full capacity.8' On the
whole, labor mobility is an asset to employers rather than a liability.
When employers derive benefits from a mobile labor force, the risk of
pension forfeiture in job turnovers should not be borne by the em-
ployee who is often the victim rather than the cause of such changes.
Insofar as part of an employer's contribution to a pension plan is
designed to induce employee longevity, employers' criticisms of vesting
reforms which do not take such a goal into account are valid. This ob-
jection, however, must be balanced with the interests of employees in
private pension benefits. The longevity argument should not be used
to deprive the majority of employees of all pension benefits. Employers
do not merely give pension benefits to their life-long workers. Such
rights are earned. 2
A possible solution which would take into account these competing
interests would again be an accelerated vesting standard.83 Since an em-
ployee would receive a greater percentage of pension benefits the longer
he worked for an. employer, an accelerated vesting provision would
satisfy the interest of the employer in retaining employees while also
taking into account the interest of an employee in his pension.
B. Cost
An even greater objection of employers to liberalized vesting stan-
dards is that the additional expense involved would bankrupt the
private pension system. They argue that the payment of pension bene-
fits which are now avoided by rapid job turnovers would increase costs
significantly.8 4 Opponents also claim that under a fully vested and port-
81 The effective functioning of the Nation's labor market system rests on the
individual worker's freedom to change jobs to parts of the economy where his
services can be better utilized . . . . Although the lack of vesting in private
pension plans may not currently constitute a major impediment to labor mobility,
it clearly is a deterrent to mobility for important segments of the labor force
including highly skilled professional, technical, other white collar, and some
manual workers. Moreover, such a deterrent to mobility may well become more
serious in the future as technological progress continues and as participants in
relatively new pension plans acquire a greater stake in the plans' benefits.
PRESIENT'S COMM'N ON CORP. PENSION FUNDS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PRO-
GRAMS: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RErIREMENT PLANS 40 (1965).
82 R. SHOEMAKER, supra note 36, at 3.
83 Note 69 supra.
84 See Remarks of Herbert Ferster, Representative of the Clothing Mfrs. Ass'n, to the
House Educ. and Labor Committee:
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able pension system many employees would qualify under more than
one plan. This double qualification would lead to duplicate administra-
tive expenditures. Such a system would also require the maintenance of
extensive employee records.
Calculating the potential costs of improved vesting standards is an
enormously difficult task owing to the many variables involved.8 5 The
single most important factor is turnover rates. High turnover rates
would create additional pension expenses which employers now avoid
through stringent vesting requirements. Differences in the financing
methods of employer pension plans also influence the amount of em-
ployer contributions needed to secure a given level of benefits. Finally,
the individual circumstances of each employer would determine the
impact that liberal vesting standards would have on his costs. An em-
ployer whose pension eligibility requirements were already low would
face little in the way of increased expenditures.
As a result of so many variables, there are conflicting data as to the
costs of full or accelerated vesting standards.8 6 Most experts estimate
that the cost would amount to approximately twenty percent more than
the cost necessary to cover workers under present pension plans.
81
The claim that a fully vested pension plan system would entail
overwhelming administrative costs would be without basis if a federally-
funded clearing house were established. Such an organization would be
able to reduce expenses by eliminating duplicate records on employees
who qualify under more than one pension plan. This agency would
also serve as a medium through which retired employees could be con-
veniently located and paid benefits. Costs would thus be reduced and
more employer funds could be channeled towards increased investment
earnings. Such higher earnings in turn would offset some of the addi-
tional costs of lower vesting standards.
Multi-employer-union pension plans should not be required to vest, fully
fund or insure past-service liability .... If these requirements were imposed on
the clothing workers' plan, benefits would have to be reduced by 80 per cent or
employer contributions increased by 80 per cent, which employers could not afford.
1970 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 770.
85 M. BmENsTiN, supra note 1, at 250.
86 Some manufacturers have claimed that full vesting pensions would almost double
the costs of their contributions. Note 84 supra. The President's Commission on Pension
Plans estimated the increase in cost of a 15-year graded pension system as between 5%
and 10%. PRasm Nr's Coasa'N ON CORP. PENSION FUNDS, supra note 81, at 46. The Depart-
ment of Labor, however, calculated the additional expenditures for a similar minimum
graded vesting standard at between 3% and 6%. Hearings 271.




Even if the monetary costs of a fully vested pension plan system
were extremely high, the social and individual costs of the present sys-
tem are much higher.s8 When only one in six workers covered by private
pension plans ever receives benefits,"9 there is need for a drastic reap-
praisal of the system. Unless adequate measures are taken to correct the
basic flaws in private pensions, enormous pressures will continue to
grow and might well result in the undermining of the entire private
pension system. 0
Pensions are not gratuitous fringe benefits. Employees earn the
right to retirement income through the work they perform. Pension
benefits must be extended to reach all workers who participate in pen-
sion plans. Even if retired employees must accept a lower level of bene-
fits, pension plans should discard the widespread disqualifications in the
current system. Judicial adoption of the quantum meruit theory and
compulsory legislative vesting standards are methods by which pension
benefits can be extended to all who earn them. No matter what the
method, however, the gap between promise and performance in today's
private pension system must be closed.
Timothy J. Heinsz
88 A significant portion of the elderly spend their declining years in relative poverty.
Senator Javits has stated:
The Senate Special Committee on Aging has reported just last year that 1 out of
every 4 persons over age 65 lives in poverty and the number is steadily increasing.
In New York City alone, over 12 per cent of the city's population-one million
persons-consists of senior citizens over age 65. Substantial numbers of these
persons are living from hand-to-mouth in the most deplorable conditions, with
inadequate sources of income to maintain a decent and dignified standard of
living.
How many of these persons are retired workers who were covered by private
pension plans, but who left empty-handed, nobody really knows. Judging from
the complaints my office has received, the number is quite significant.
117 CONG. REC. S 8293 (daily ed. June 4, 1971).
89 Note 4 supra.
90 Many critics of private pension plans are seeking the complete absorption of the
private pension system by the Social Security system. See 1970 CONG. Q. ALMANAc 770, 771
(remarks of D. Allen and N. McClung). However, this absorption would not only destroy
the flexibility of negotiated or employer established pension plans, but would also elimi-
nate a large source of private investment capital.
